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EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY-ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY-ECONOMIC AND FISCAL INSTRUMENTS-
REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP OF EXPERTS FROM
THE MEMBER STATES PROPOSES THE USE OF
ECONOMIC AND FISCAL INSTRUMENTS TO ATTAIN
COMMUNITY-WIDE ENVIRONMENTAL GOALS
I. FACTS
On November 28, 1989 the Environment Council' of the European
Community2 requested that an independent group of national experts'
prepare a detailed report on the use of economic and fiscal instruments
in the environmental policy of the Community. The purpose of the
report was to evaluate the potential effectiveness of these instruments
in addressing the environmental problems before the EC. The impetus
for this action was the failure of the current regulatory measures4
and the push toward a unified market. Due to the fact that the
experts participated on an individual basis, the report is neither the
official responsibility of the Commission nor of the Member States;
however, it serves as a theoretical framework for a new approach to
environmental regulation by the European Community. 5
The Report of the Working Group of Experts from the Member
States on the Use of Economic and Fiscal Instruments in EC En-
vironmental Policy6 (Experts' Report or Report) is an important point
The Environment Council is composed of the environment ministers from the
European Community's twelve Member States.
2 The European Community (EC) consists of: Belgium, Denmark, Germany,
Greece, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and
the United Kingdom.
I The group of national experts was drawn chiefly from senior environment
department officials from each state. Pienaar, Brussels Takes Stronger Line on
Pollution "Fines"; Radical EC Proposals For "Green Taxes" Will Provoke Stiff
British Resistance, The Independent, Sept. 21, 1990, at 2.
4 Regulatory measures consist of the traditional practice of implementing max-
imum emission levels allowable under penalty of law.
I The Commission is expected to formally adopt this report in the coming months.
Dickson, Carbon Tax Plan Reappears on the EC Agenda, Fin. Times, Aug. 9, 1990,
at 7.
6 Report of the Working Group of Experts from the Member States on the Use
of Economic and Fiscal Instruments in EC Environmental Policy (Sept. 5, 1990)
(available from the Commission of the European Communities) [hereinafter Experts'
Report].
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in the Community's gradual movement from a regulatory policy of
environmental protection to a policy based on the use of economic
incentives.7 Though this concept is not new to the region, the shift
in policy has been dramatically accelerated over the past year.
After the initial request for the Report was made by the Environ-
ment Council, the Environment Ministers convened for an informal
meeting on April 21, 1990, to further address the use of economic
and fiscal instruments. During the conclave, the Ministers reiterated
their commitment to the imposition of a system of EC-wide instru-
ments to complement, and in some instances replace, the regulatory
measures that were currently in effect. The presidency conclusions
to the meeting stated that the "Ministers acknowledged the value of
supplementing existing regulatory instruments ... by the use of
economic and fiscal instruments.''8 A very similar position was es-
poused during the Bergen Conference 9 in May 1990, when an increased
commitment to the use of environmentally driven tax measures was
made. l0
In June of 1990 the European Council, during its meeting in Dublin,
included in its Declaration a chapter on environmental concerns. The
text of the chapter concluded with the following statement:
We therefore call on the Commission to accelerate its work in this
field [of economic and fiscal instruments] and to present, before
the end of 1990, proposals for a framework or guidelines within
which such measures could be into effect by the Member States in
a manner consistent with the Treaties."
This Declaration was followed by the release of a draft report by
the Economic Instruments Task Force. The task force study was
initiated by the Commission in response to its determination that
fiscal initiatives were a necessary component of its environmental
policy. The report 2 called for the use of economic instruments and
stated that the harmonization of taxes within the Internal Market
7 Economic and fiscal instruments used in environmental policy are sometimes
referred to as "ecotaxes" or "green taxes."
8 Experts' Report, supra note 6, at 2.
9 Id. Ministerial Declaration of the Bergen Conference, May 1990.
10 Experts' Report Sets Out Steps Towards EC Environmental Taxation, EC
ENERGY MONTHLY, Aug. 1990, at 1.
1 Experts' Report, supra note 6, at 2.
12 Economic Instruments of Environmental Policy: An Internal Report Prepared
for the Senior Advisory Group on the Environment (Dec. 1990) (unpublished doc-
ument).
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must be accomplished with environmental concerns in mind. 3 These
previous initiatives by various entities within the Community increased
awareness in the potential effectiveness of economic instruments and
resulted in a need for an exhaustive analysis of such a policy.
The Experts' Report proposes a comprehensive system of financial
incentives and penalties to address the increasing problem of envi-
ronmental degradation. The paper is supported by the Italian gov-
ernment, the present holder of the EC presidency, and the Environment
Commissioner, Carlo Ripa di Meana. 14 While the Report calls for
the Commission to formulate proposals on this matter by the end
of 1990, to this date no formal action has been taken. Regardless
of the delay,' 5 this report provided sober reading for those who
doubted that fiscal instruments would be implemented on a Com-
munity-wide scale.' 6
The Experts' Report is comprised of three major sections: an
introduction into the need for market mechanisms; an examination
of the basic elements of economic instruments; and an evaluation of
environmental problems which could be addressed through these in-
struments.
The present structure of environmental control by the Community
consists predominately of regulatory measures. The market mechan-
isms that are in effect are products of individual legislation by Member
States rather than a Community-wide program.' 7 The Report states
The Report disagreed with the traditional view that economic growth and
environmental concerns were mutually exclusive. Rather the task force position was
that with a new commitment to sustained growth, the Community should be able
to reconcile economic development and the environment. EC Official Says Fiscal
Instruments to See Greater Use for Pollution Control, 13 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA)
No. 4, at 151 (April 11, 1990).
14 Mr. Carlo Ripa di Meana has been an enthusiastic proponent of a market
mechanism approach in addressing environmental degradation. Dickson, supra note
5, at 7. Additionally, the Commissioner is pushing hard for a harmonized "green
tax" system to be implemented by the Commission. Pienaar, supra note 3, at 2.
15 One possible explanation is that the Commission believes that this is not the
proper time to increase energy costs, given the uncertainty of energy prices due to
the Gulf War.
1" EC Moves Toward Green Taxes, Fin. Times, Aug. 24, 1990, at European
Energy Report.
17 A number of the more advanced industrial states would prefer that environ-
mental taxes be continued on a national basis rather than be harmonized. The
reasoning is that individual application may work an advantageous distortion of
competition for those countries who already have made some headway in addressing
this problem. Percival, Environment: Green Taxes for Europe? An Inter Press Service,
Inter Press Service, Sept. 25, 1990, at 1.
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that both the regulatory approach of the Community and the na-
tionalistic use of economic instruments are inadequate measures to
address the Community's environmental problems.
Regulatory controls offer no incentive to the polluter to minimize
his waste beyond that which is required by law. The result is that
the cost of the damage to the environment is externalized and must
be borne by the public sector. Through the implementation of fiscal
and economic instruments, the Report attempts to internalize these
environmental costs so that the price of a product or service will
ultimately reflect the actual total cost to the Community. The Report
does not call for the complete abolition of the regulatory controls,
but rather for the simultaneous use of both static regulatory limits
and fiscal instruments.
With regard to the implementation of these instruments by the
Community rather than individual states, the Report points out that
allowing separate systems to evolve would run counter to the planned
realization of an Internal Market in 1992 as set out in the EEC
Treaty.' The Treaty was subsequently amended in 1987 by the Single
European Act.' 9
In addition to being more effective, Community standards avoid
the risk of creating fiscal barriers between various Member States;
a risk which is an inherent part of any nationalistic approach. Thus,
it is clear to the Member States experts that any environmental taxes
which are implemented must be done on the Community level to
avoid potential trade distortions.
One final impetus prompting the Commission to address this issue
was that the Community is the signatory to a number of international
conventions on pollution, and will certainly sign on to more in the
future. In that capacity, the Community is ultimately responsible for
environmental compliance on an international level.
The Report points out the importance of distinguishing between
the incentive impact of economic instruments and the raising of
revenue. The goals of the two are dissimilar, and therefore each
should be conducted in a distinct manner. Obviously the incentive
tax attempts to discourage harmful activity, while the revenue tax
aims to accumulate the necessary funds to address environmental
problems which do occur. One is preventive and the other curative.
18 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter EEC Treaty].
,9 Single European Act, 30 O.J. EuR. Comm. (No. L 169) 1 (1987).
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On an economic level, incentive charges should be budget neutral
and create no additional tax burden.
Once the motive for implementing the market mechanism is de-
termined, the policy and the surrounding conditions will dictate which
fiscal instrument is best suited to address that specific problem. The
mechanisms which are available to effect an alteration of behavior
in a manner that is more favorable to the environment are: 1) en-
vironmental charges and taxes,7° 2) tradeable emission permits,2' 3)
deposit-refund systems, 4) enforcement incentives,2 5) financial aid,23
6) industry agreements, and 7) environmental liability.Y
In order to determine the potential of proposed instruments the
Report lists five criteria for review: 1) the overall environmental
effectiveness or reduction of harmful practices, 2) the economic ef-
ficiency or degree of adjustments made to the price structure, 3) the
practicability of the measure and its administrative costs, 4) the
fairness of the policy and the acceptability to the public as well as
industry, and 5) the economic impact to the Community.
The Report proposes that the Community apply these economic
and fiscal instruments to address both global and regional environ-
mental problems. The strongest proposal is for a drastic incentive
tax on carbon dioxide (C02) emissions to deal with the growing
problem of global warming. The paper urges that such a tax or charge
be implemented in order to internalize the actual cost of the energy
source and to reduce the overall consumption of fossil fuels. Pos-
sibilities suggested are either a tax system or a more moderate system
of tradable emission permits.
As far as direct taxation, an emissions charge determined at the
source of the pollution is the most equitable for industrial waste.
The consumer, due to the number and mobility of the sources, could
be assessed a product charge based upon the contribution of that
o These may be applied as emissions charges, products charges/taxes or tax
differentiation.
2, This creates a secondary market in pollution permits that acts as a component
of a regulatory scheme.
"2 Some examples are performance bonds and non-compliance fees which coerce
the polluter to abide by the regulations that are prescribed.
Though Community subsidies are an option, this contradicts the "polluter
pays" principle of Article 130r.
2, A switch to strict liability places the burden of proof on the polluter and results
in higher premiums for the insured unless he can lower the environmental risks of
his. activities.
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fuel source to the overall global warming problem. 25 Clearly the
desired effect of such a program is a drastic increase in the price of
fossil fuels.
Ozone depletion is the other global issue dealt with by the Report.
Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) are the cause of severe ozone depletion.
Given that safer alternative chemicals cost three to five times as much
as the CFCs used today, an incentive tax should be put into place
to force a switch to the available, cleaner technology.
The regional problems addressed by the study run from water
contamination to air traffic noise pollution. The proposed fiscal
instruments are again an effort to internalize the cost of these products
and to put the "polluter pays" principle26 into practical effect. In
order for the "polluter pays" approach to be realized, the polluter
must be responsible for all direct and collateral effects of his actions.
One of the more drastic proposals in the Report concerns a new
approach to agricultural policies within the Community. Agricultural
production is the source of many environmental contaminants to both
the soil and the groundwater supply. These substances include pes-
ticides, as well as nitrates and phosphates found in fertilizers. The
larger problem is found in the present system of price support within
the Community which, through governmental price support, encour-
ages the farmer to maintain the status quo in agricultural methods.
The result is that intensive farming practices which are most harmful
to the environment are encouraged. In response to this problem, the
Experts' Report proposes an abolition of certain types of national
aid, in conjunction with an incentive tax on these agricultural con-
taminants. Due to the effectiveness of the pesticides and fertilizers
in use, a high incentive tax must be applied in order to facilitate a
switch to more environmentally correct methods. One way that the
report suggests to lessen the financial blow on the farmer is to channel
a portion of the revenue raised back to the farmers in the form of
subsidies. Obviously these subsidies must be consistent with the com-
petition guidelines of the Internal Market.
Another proposed solution concerns the Community's high level
of automobile traffic and the subsequent air pollution that results.
2 Such a system would consist of a graduate charge increasing in severity based
upon the level of C02 emissions of the fuel. In essence, coal would be charged a
much higher rate than gasoline.
26 EEC Treaty, supra note 18, art. 130r(2); added by Single European Act, supra
note 19, art. 25, at 12.
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The Report's response to this issue is a combination of economic
and fiscal measures. First, the report reiterates the need for an excise
tax on carbon fuels, to be harmonized in accordance with the dictates
of the Internal Market. Secondly, it suggests a vehicle or special
consumer tax which could be returned as a subsidy to reduce the
cost of automobiles which employ cleaner technology. Thirdly, it
proposes an annual road tax on all vehicles based upon the auto-
mobile's weight and engine capacity or, in the alternative, upon the
degree of carbon emission. Finally, the report calls for a fixed road
use charge or toll to be applied consistently throughout the Com-
munity in order to prevent fiscal barriers or distortions.
In the area of waste disposal, the Experts' Report calls for a three
part approach. Given in the order of importance, the areas are: 1)
prevention, 2) reuse and recycling, and 3) more efficient treatment,
incineration and land disposal of the waste that is created. To further
these aims the Report proposes a deposit/refund system, as well as
a charge or tax differentiation 27 for harmful products. The degree of
incentive tax should obviously vary according to the risk of the
product.
This Report, given at the urging of the Commission, is a clear
mandate for a comprehensive system of economic and fiscal instru-
ments to address the growing environmental problems within the
Community. In conclusion the Report states:
The development of economic and fiscal instruments of environ-
mental policy is also required at EC level, essentially to cope with
pollution on a transboundary or a global scale, to prevent trade
distortion, and to prevent each Member State from postponing action
to avoid competitive disadvantages, even in the short term.21
This exhaustive analysis of options available to the Commission should
form the basis of the Community's environmental policy and create
support for a shift from the static approach of regulatory limits to
a more dynamic policy of market mechanisms. 29 Report of the Work-
27 Thus, cleaner products would carry a lower tax than dirtier ones. This has
been an effective instrument in the introduction of unleaded gasoline within the
Community. Its attributes are that it is budget neutral and has very little administrative
costs. Commission Expected to Consider Issue of Using Taxes to Promote Pollution
Control, 13 Int'l Env't Rep. Current Report (BNA) No. 10, at 383, (Sept. 26, 1990).
28 Experts' Report, supra note 6, at 19.
29 The implantation of this position has already begun, although not on a formal
level. In a December 20, 1990 "working paper," the European Commission called
for a package of taxes to address the issue of global warming. EC Favors Energy
Tax, Will Sound Out Members First, The Reuter Library Report, Dec. 20, 1990.
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ing Group of Experts from the Member States on the Use of Economic
and Fiscal Instruments in EC Environmental Policy (Sept. 5, 1990).
II. LAW
Environmental concern is not a recent development within the
Member States or the Community. However, at the inception of the
EC none of the three treaties creating the Community contained
explicit provisions granting authority to act in the area of environ-
mental policy.30 Therefore, initial control over environmental issues
remained in the hands of the Member States.
In the 1970s the Community began to move toward the harmonized
control of certain environmental matters. In its progression toward
a single market, the Community began the "General Program for
the elimination of technical barriers within the Community." 3' In-
cluded within this program were several directives which laid down
Community-wide environmental regulatory standards, which in some
instances replaced inconsistent national standards.3 2 Examples of this
type of directive are: 1) measures against air pollution caused by
motor vehicles, 33 2) requirements on the biodegradability of deter-
gents, 34 and 3) limits on the sulfur content of specific fuels. 35 The
Community realized that differing environmental standards would
produce fiscal barriers within the Common Market and undertook
to harmonize their regulatory approach.
In Paris during 1972, national leaders of the Member States of
the Community published the "summit declaration" which expressed
their desire that the Community develop an EC environmental policy.3 6
This declaration was followed up by a draft action program submitted
by the Commission to the Council calling for just such an EC-wide
environmental policy. 3 7 This Community action program has been
modified in 1977, 1983, and in 1987. While this program called for
" In fact, the term "environment" is not found in any of the documents at that
time. Haagsma, The European Community's Environmental Policy: A Case Study
in Federalism, 12 FoRDnAm INT'L L. J. 311, 315 (1989).
1, Council Resolution of May 28, 1969, 12 J.0. COMM. EUR. (No. C 76) 1 (1969).
32 Haagsma, supra note 30, at 316.
3 Council Directive No. 70/220, 13 J.0. COMM. EUR. (No. L 76) 1 (1970).
-- Council Directive No. 73/404, O.J. COMM. EUR. (No. L 347) 51 (1973).
11 Council Directive No. 75/716, O.J. COMM. EUR. (No. L 307) 22 (1975).
3 Declaration of The First Summit Conference of the Enlarged Community,
reprinted in E.C. Bull No. 10, at 14, 20 (1972).
31 Council Declaration of Nov. 22, 1973, on the Programme of Action of the
European Communities on the Environment, O.J. Comm. EuR. (No. C 112) 1 (1973).
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an environmental policy, it did not provide the legal foundation for
one.38
The original EEC Treaty provided only an implied authoritative
basis to implement a Community environmental policy in order to
attain a single market. Article 10O39 grants authority to the Council,
acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission, to preside
over all matters that directly affect the "establishment or functioning
of the common market." 4 Thus, the Community could address all
environmental matters which have the potential of erecting fiscal
barriers within the planned Internal Market.
The Single European Act (SEA)41 in 1987 went one step further
by granting the Community express oversight into environmental
matters. First, the SEA amended the Treaty by inserting Title VII,
referred to as the Environmental Title ("Title"). 42 Secondly, the
amending document added a specific reference to environmental pro-
tection to the new article 100a on the harmonization of Member State
legislation. 43 Thus, the SEA gave the Community explicit authority
to continue and expand upon its endeavors in the area of environ-
mental protection.
While the legal basis for unified Community control was achieved,
the enhanced role of the Community in the environment had its
critics. Several states which already enforced high environmental stan-
dards objected to centralized control for fear that the Community
standards would be lower and less effective. The new Treaty addressed
this concern in article 100a(4) by allowing individual states to opt
out of a harmonized standard for reasons of environmental pro-
tection."
Article 130r 5 of the Environment Title provides the substantive
goals of the Community's environmental polices. Due to the broad
31 Haagsma, supra note 30, at 319.
39 EEC Treaty, supra note 18, art. 100.
4 Id.
" Single European Act, supra note 19.
,2 Single European Act, supra note 19, at 11.
43 EEC Treaty, supra note 18, art. 100a(3); added by Single European Act, supra
note 19, art. 18, at 8.
" "If, after the adoption of a harmonization measure by the Council ... a
Member State deems it necessary to apply national provisions ... relating to pro-
tection of the environment . . .it shall notify the Commission of these provisions."
See EEC Treaty, supra note 18, art 100a(4); added by Single European Act, supra
note 18, art. 18, at 8.
41 EEC Treaty, supra note 18, art 130r(l); added by Single European Act, supra
note 19, art. 25, at 11.
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sweep of power that this general aim places with the Community,
the Member States insisted that unanimous Council vote be required
in order to implement any measure based on this article." The Member
States felt that this protection was necessary in order to ensure that
the Community did not abuse its power. 47
The Title sets out four principles that should be used to guide the
EC's environmental policy in article 130r(2). "Action by the Com-
munity relating to the environment shall be based on the principles
that:
1. preventive action should be taken,
2. environmental damage should, as a priority, be rectified at the
source,
3. the polluter should pay,
4. and the environmental protection requirements shall be a com-
ponent of the Community's other policies. 48
It appears that given the broad nature of these principles, the insti-
tutions of the Community can claim a relatively large discretionary
margin. 49 The European Court of Justice (ECJ) should only declare
a regulation or directive based on this article invalid when it is in
manifest error, a misuse of power, or when the institution clearly
exceeds its bounds of authority 0
Within this criteria, the authority for economic initiatives is laid.
The foundation of all fiscal approaches to environmental protection
undertaken by the Member States is the "polluter pays" principle
encapsuled in article 130r(2). 5 The principle states in clear terms that
all who burden or harm the environment are required to bear the
costs of avoiding, eliminating and compensating for these injuries . 2
This principle provides the legal basis for a dynamic approach to the
reduction of pollutants and the development of clean technology.
The "polluter pays" principle does not always exist in pure form.
In some instances environmental regulation will result in severe ec-
EEC Treaty, supra note 18, art. 130s; added by Single European Act, supra
note 19, art 25, at 11.
41 Haagsma, supra note 30, at 337.
48 EEC Treaty, supra note 18, art 130r(2); added by Single European Act, supra
note 19, art. 25, at 11.
49 Haagsma, supra note 30, at 340.
50 Id.
11 EEC Treaty, supra note 18, art. 130r(2); added by Single European Act, supra
note 19, art. 25, at 11.
52 Id.
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onomic hardship for vital national undertakings. The compromise
solution that has been taken by the states is to adjust the "polluter
pays" principle to comply with the economic realities of a competitive
market through the use of subsidies. Subsidies channel public revenues
to the private concern so that it is able to meet its duty under the
"polluter pays" principle of article 130r(2). This compromise between
the goals of environmental protection and undistorted trade is one
of the substantial problems in the individual application of fiscal
instruments by the Member States.
Though subsidies are used, there are limitations under the EEC
Treaty. Article 92(1)- 3 prohibits all state aids which distort or threaten
to distort competition by favoring certain undertakings or certain
goods as far as they affect trade between Member States. This severe
restriction does not apply to the European Commission, thereby
granting it a free hand to aid those concerns which are unduly
disadvantaged by a stricter approach to environmental protection.5 4
In administering such a fund, the Commission is not restrained as
the Member States are with respect to the creation of distortions
within the market. The result does not conform to the true intent
of the "polluter pays" principle, but provides a practical solution to
the possible severe economic impact of tighter environmental controls.
Article 130r(3) formulates the criteria to be considered before the
Community undertakes any environmental action. The Community
shall take account of:
1. available scientific and technical data,
2. environmental conditions in the various regions of the Com-
munity,
3. the potential benefits and costs of action or lack of action,
4. the economic and social development of the Community as a
whole and the balanced development of its regions."5
However, in taking these factors into consideration, the Community
shall only take action within the environmental field if the desired
objectives can be better attained at the Community level rather than
13 EEC Treaty, supra note 18, art. 92(1).
14 See, European Social Fund, Id. at art. 125; the European Investment Bank,
Id. at art. 130; the European Agricultural Guidance and Guaranty Fund, Id. at art.
40(4).
ss EEC Treaty, supra note 18, art. 130r(3); added by Single European Act, supra
note 19, art. 25, at 11-12.
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through individual state legislation. 6 This allocation of authority is
referred to as the principle of "subsidiarity.1 5 7 Its application allows
the Member States to retain a degree of sovereign control over their
environmental policies.
The last provision of the "Environmental Title," article 130t,58
allows individual states to adopt measures which are more stringent
than those put into place by the Community; provided they are
compatible with the remainder of the Treaty. 9 In order for a Member
State to implement stricter measures, the displaced Community stan-
dard must be intended only as an environmental measure and not
as a means to accomplish additional Community goals, such as the
removal of fiscal barriers. °
Though articles 130r-t grants the Community greater authority for
environmental control, each Member State retains its sovereign power
over its environmental policies, thereby giving articles 130r-t a de-
claratory character. 6' The powers of the Community do not preempt
those of the states under the EEC Treaty, but rather run parallel to
them. 62
One of those powers retained by the states is the use of economic
and fiscal instruments. In the policies of the Member States, taxes
are the most important instruments used to enforce the "polluter
pays" principle. 63 However, there are severe restrictions on these
national instruments which are necessary to prevent unequal com-
petitive positions between the Members of the Community.
Environmental taxes, like all other charges levied by the Member
States, are subject to article 95 of the EEC Treaty which prohibits
any discriminatory taxation of goods imported from another Member
State." This provision deals exclusively with taxes which are imposed
when goods cross borders; it is strictly concerned with the movement
EEC Treaty, supra note 18, art. 130r(4); added by Single European Act, supra
note 19, art. 25, at 12.
17 Haagsma, supra note 30, at 342.
51 EEC Treaty, supra note 18, art. 130t; added by Single European Act, supra
note 19, art. 25, at 12.
19 Haagsma, supra note 30, at 347.
Id. at 348.
61 Id. at 425.
62 Id.
61 Grabitz & Zacker, Scope of Action by the EC Member States for the Im-
provement of Environmental Protection under EEC Law: The Example of Envi-
ronmental Taxes and Subsidies, 26 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 423, 441 (1989).
EEC Treaty, supra note 18, art. 95.
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of products and is an extension of the sovereign power of the Member
States .65
Article 99 of the Treaty deals with the harmonization of indirect
taxes, including environmental excise taxes. 66 The harmonization is
intended to prevent any distortion of competition.6 7 As long as the
Council does not enact provisions calling for the harmonization of
these indirect taxes, 61 the Member States are free to introduce new
indirect environmental taxes.
The harmonization of direct taxes, such as duties and contributions,
is governed by articles 10069 and 100a,70 with the same concern for
preventing distortions within the Internal Market. To this point, no
legislation has been drafted to bring complete control of all direct
taxation, including environmental charges, under the oversight of the
Community authorities .71
The individual states are also free to impose customs duties to
implement their environmental policies with several restrictions. In
order to comply with article 12 of the EEC Treaty, n the charges
must be levied against both outgoing domestic products and incoming
foreign goods. Additionally, the charge must be based on the same
features in the products or be assessed against the same stage of
production. Within that framework, an environmentally oriented duty
may be assessed in the form of an inspection fee, used to determine
the environmental compatibility of the product, as long as the col-
lected funds are not used solely for the benefit of domestic under-
takings .71
EEC Treaty article 100a, introduced by the SEA, relates to direct
environmental charges or taxes and bestows upon the Community a
legal duty to dismantle trade barriers which prevent realization of
the Internal Market. 74 Though this amended provision grants the
Council expanded powers in the area of environmental charges, the
6, Grabitz & Zacker, supra note 63, at 442.
6 EEC Treaty, supra note 18, art. 99.
67 Id.
"' One current example is the excise tax on leaded gasoline, imposed on a state-
by-state basis as an incentive to encourage the use of cleaner unleaded petrol.
69 EEC Treaty, supra note 18, art. 100.
70 EEC Treaty, supra note 18, art 100a; added by Single European Act, supra
note 19, art. 18, at 8.
7' Grabitz & Zacker, supra note 63, at 442.
72 EEC Treaty, supra note 18, art. 12.
71 Grabitz & Zacker, supra note 63, at 443.
7 Id. at 445.
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Member States, under article 100a(4), retain the power to enforce
more stringent national environmental charges even past the point of
complete harmonization. 7
The overall effect of the SEA did not remove the Member States
ability to implement economic and fiscal instruments for the protec-
tion of the environment. However, the addition of the "Environ-
mental Title" gave a mandate to the Council to develop a system
for the practical application of the "polluter pays" principle. 76 Ad-
ditionally, article 100a requires that all measures designed to achieve
a single market must incorporate the environmental dimension.
Until a comprehensive Community plan is introduced, the Member
States may continue to assess environmental charges provided that
they burden domestic and foreign products equally. 77 At this point
the Council has not attempted to harmonize indirect taxes under
article 99 nor have they addressed the harmonization of direct taxes
under article 100a. Therefore, individual states are competent to
implement appropriate economic and fiscal instruments to address
their environmental concerns. 78
Though the Council has not implemented any Community-wide
economic instruments, there are nonetheless several successful ex-
amples which are currently being used on a national basis. Greece
and the Netherlands have imposed tax differentiation systems which
promote the use of motor vehicles that are safer for the environment.
Greece grants a tax break of up to 40% for cars which are equipped
with a three-way catalytic converter. These tax advantages result in
a lower purchase price offered by the dealer. The Netherlands bases
its tax advantage on the quality of the cars' exhaust, and the au-
tomobiles with better emission figures receive a discount on the special
consumer tax which is added onto the Value Added Tax (VAT). 79
This measure is budget neutral due to the fact that the discounts are
financed through an increase in the tax on all other cars. The result
in the Netherlands has been an increase in the sale of these cars from
5% to 60% of the market.80
11 Id. at 446.
76 Id. at 447.
77 Id.
78 Id.
19 "Value Added Tax - a tax assessed on the addition to the original worth of
raw materials or components as they are processed further in manufacturing."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 805 (5th ed. 1983).
10 Experts' Report, supra note 6, at Annex 2-1.
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Germany has used a system of water effluent charges since 1981.
The charge is assessed against industrial as well as individual con-
sumers that discharge certain impurities into the water. The charge
is based on the chemical oxygen demand, the organic halogen com-
pounds, heavy metals and the toxicity to fish. An incentive is offered
to employ the best possible technology to maintain the effluent level
below that permitted; discounts up to 80% are possible. The result
has been a substantial increase in the number of water treatment
facilities, both collectively and privately owned.8'
Denmark employs a deposit-refund program for beverage containers
used for beer, wine and soft drinks. The system results in a nearly
100% return rate of the containers. This system has been approved
by the Court of Justice, with the reservation that it may be invalidated
if the Community harmonizes this area of taxation.8 2
In 1989 Italy introduced a charge on all non-biodegradable plastic
bags which were domestically produced or imported. The charge
trebled the price of the product and the consumption of the bags
declined 40% .3
Several EC Member States have introduced an excise tax differential
between leaded and unleaded gasoline; the purpose being to increase
the market share of the cleaner burning unleaded gasoline. The excise
tax resulted in a drastic decline in the demand for regular petrol and
forced oil companies to withdraw it from the market. This penetration
of unleaded gasoline into the market made the introduction of three-
way catalytic converters possible throughout the Community. How-
ever, the Report points out that lack of concerted Community action
resulted in a loss of efficiency which could have been avoided.8
While presently no program of economic and fiscal instruments is
in place on a Community-wide basis, it appears that there is adequate
authority within the amended Treaty for such a system to exist.
Additionally, the actions of the Member States within this area have
demonstrated the potential effectiveness of this approach in addressing
the environmental issues within the Community.
III. ANALYSIS
The support for the use of economic and fiscal instruments in the
Community's environmental policies stems from the failure of reg-
8, Id. at Annex 2-1, 2-2.
82 Id. at Annex 2-2.
83 Id.
84 Id. at Annex 2-2, 2-3.
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ulatory measures and the desire to avoid the inevitable trade distor-
tions that accompany separate national legislation.
The regulatory controls have failed to effectively address the in-
creasing environmental problems facing the region. The use of this
static method provides no incentive to reduce pollutants below the
permitted levels, and in doing so fails to properly internalize the cost
of the damage to the environment. The historic preference for reg-
ulatory control has been rooted in two beliefs. First, the Member
States and the Community believed that a regulatory limit offered a
greater assurance that environmental quality standards would be met;
the assumption being that sanctions are more effective than incentives.
Coupled with this belief, industry was opposed due to the additional
costs that it expected would be added to production.
The Member States experts discount both positions. Clearly the
system that is in place today is ineffective in protecting the environ-
ment, and this failure will become even more evident with the eco-
nomic growth which will undoubtedly accompany the establishment
of the 1992 Internal Market. In addition, the experts do not adhere
to the traditional notion that environmental protection and economic
growth are mutually exclusive. Rather, there is a new emphasis on
sustainable growth.
Given this mandate for action, the use of dynamic market me-
chanisms is the most promising option. Their success is not only
theoretically attractive, but there is evidence from their use in the
Member States that economic and fiscal instruments can be, if used
properly, powerful tools in managing the environmental assets of the
Community.
The imminence of the completion of the Internal Market provides
the impetus to implement these instruments on a Community-wide,
rather than a national, basis. The requirement that all fiscal barriers
be dismantled prohibits the use of national product taxes which distort
trade; environmental taxes fall into this category. Given the dramatic
structural change that will come about within the Community as a
result of an Internal Market, it is an opportune time to implement
a more effective environmental policy.
Besides the harmonization problems inherent in the state-by-state
use of economic instruments, there is also the issue of effectiveness.
The experts clearly believe that effective action against these regional
and global problems can only be achieved through Community-wide
action. First, individual Member States are not capable of dealing
with transboundary pollution problems. Secondly, only through cen-
tralized control can the Community comply with the international
[Vol. 21:285
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conventions on global problems to which it is a signatory. s5
Finally, the Report concludes that although incentive taxes should
be budget neutral, there is likely to be some use of these instruments
as a means to raise revenue for environmental purposes. Given that
scenario, it is likely that the funds would be returned to the Com-
munity in the form of subsidies, and only the Commission is immune
from the severe restrictions that the EEC Treaty puts on subsidies
as a form of state aid.
The significance of the acceptance of this dynamic approach to
environmental policy is that the environment will become inextricably
linked to all facets of industrial and agricultural economic planning. 6
While the traditional command-and-control system of regulation will
remain in place to a certain degree, economic instruments will offer
a financial incentive to conserve and preserve the Community's re-
sources. 87 This new political approach to the environment is a product
of increased public concern, as well as industry's realization that
further steps are needed. In a recent Community survey, one-half of
the European businesses polled considered environmental protection
an important consideration.88 Even the oil industry expressed its qual-
ified support for the use of reasonable economic instruments in the
place of "rigid command-and-control legislation.' '89 While industry
may not be an enthusiastic supporter of all aspects of fiscal and
economic instruments, this cognizance of environmental issues is ev-
idence that there is support for increased Community action on this
front.
While there is an increased awareness that action needs to be taken,
there is also a predictable amount of concern over the economic cost
8 One example is the acceptance of the Montreal Protocol by the EC. This
international agreement requires community-wide reductions in the level of use and
production of ozone depleting CFCs. See Montreal Protocol on Substances that
Deplete the Ozone Layer, opened for signature Sept. 16, 1987, 52 Fed. Reg. 47,489,
26 I.L.M. 1541 (1987).
" Statements by Mr. Robert Hull, Advisor to the Director-General for Environ-
ment, Nuclear Safety, and Civil Protection of the European Community Commission.
European Community Will Encourage Industry Conservation Through Carrot-Stick
Approach, 13 Int'l Env't Rep. Current Report (BNA) No. 16, at 539 (Dec. 19,
1990).
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 During the European Conference of Ministers of Transport (ECMT), Gilbert
Portal, the Secretary General of the European Petroleum Industry Association (Eu-
ropia), voiced the oil industry's support for fiscal initiatives. Oil Industry Drags Its
Feet at Transport Ministers' Meeting, European Energy Rep., Dec. 14, 1990, at 1.
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to the Community that a new policy of fiscal initiatives may entail.
Some economic forecasters predict that if a radical shift in environ-
mental policy occurs, resulting in severe fiscal measures which are
harmonized on a Community level, the result could be a cost of 362
billion ECUs ($495 billion) by the year 2005.90 Additionally, concern
exists that the least advanced Members of the Community will bear
a disproportional burden of this cost.91 However, this fear may be
tempered by the prediction that the stronger "green" policy would
also create new opportunities within the Community that could make
the environmental protection market worth more than 150 billion
ECUs within the same time frame.9 2 An additional benefit is that
this new commitment would accelerate the penetration of new, cleaner
technologies, thus giving the Community a competitive edge within
the global market.9 3
On the microeconomic scale, an increase in the use of economic
and fiscal instruments will clearly translate into higher consumer costs,
especially in the energy sector. This increase is a necessary component
of any incentive oriented "green tax."
While the Report by the Committee of Experts deals with the issue
of trade distortions within the Community, it does not address the
effect that the inherent costs of these fiscal instruments will have on
the transactions of EC undertakings outside of the Market. Potentially
these policies could, by forcing EC industries to reduce their reliance
on certain resources, make these undertakings less competitive on the
international scale. In such a system, costs of production will increase
for companies operating within the Community, which will translate
into higher prices for the consumer. However, the non-EC importer
of the same product does not incur those additional costs and is
therefore at a competitive advantage. This is especially true when the
Community addresses global concerns such as the greenhouse gases.
A unilateral reduction in C02 gases serves to benefit the international
community, but only the EC pays the cost for that environmental
90 Measures to Control Pollution Could Cost Western Europe Billions, 13 Int'l
Envtl. Rep. Current Report (BNA) No. 13, at 461 (Nov. 7, 1990).
9" The countries that have expressed opposition to such a program include: Spain,
Portugal, Greece and Ireland. Various Environmental Taxes May be Introduced by
End of 1990, 13 Int'l Envt. Rep. Current Report (BNA) No. 6, at 226 (June 13,
1990).
92 Measures to Control Pollution Could Cost Western Europe Billions, supra note
90, at 461.
93 Id.
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gain. A possible ramification is that Community undertakings will
move production to countries where production costs do not inter-
nalize environmental damage.9
One solution which has been proposed is a variation on the Value
Added Tax (VAT). 95 The system would function by assessing a pol-
lution based tax on every stage of the production and distribution
of a product. 96 The total Pollution Added Tax (PAT) is passed along
to the consumer if the product is sold domestically.97 This tax would
be applied to imported goods on the same basis. 9 However, if the
product is exported, the PAT is excused in order to allow the product
or service to compete on a level playing field within the international
market.
Although such a system aims to permit the unilateral adoption of
more stringent environmental controls, its administration would be
difficult and costly. A more efficient solution to this problem may
be a program of Commission regulated subsidies used to channel
revenue from environmental taxes back to the affected industries to
be used for the development of new technology. Not only would it
be more manageable on a practical level, but it would also provide
the proper incentives to the Community undertakings. The subsidy
approach also avoids the inevitable GATT conflicts" that would arise
if the Community assessed an environmental duty on all goods en-
tering its market.' °°
The release of this Experts' Report laid the groundwork for a
comprehensive system of economic and fiscal instruments; however,
the report itself is not a formal Commission document. Thus, there
'4 Walter, Environmentally Induced Industrial Relocation to Developing Coun-
tries, in ENVIRONMENT AND TRADE: THE RELATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 67 (1982).
91 Comment, Proposal: A Pollution Added Tax to Slow the Ozone Depletion
and Global Warming, 26 STAN. J. INT'L L. 549 (1990) (authored by Peeyush Jain).
96 Id. at 555.
9Id.
91 Though this would provide an incentive for importers located abroad to reduce
their emissions, such a reduction is unlikely since it would put them at a competitive
disadvantage in every market besides the one employing the PAT.
" General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947,
61 Stat. p. 5-6, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187, reprinted in IV GATT, BASIC
INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS 1-78 (1969).
-4 A possible problem is that even though domestic products are taxed at the
same rate as foreign imports, the revenue is used solely for domestic purposes and
may be seen as a method to subsidize domestic industry through the use of a 6tuty
on imports. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, supra note 99, art. III.
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must be action by the Commission and ultimately by the Council
for such a program to become a reality. There is every indication,
given the action of the Commission and the Council up to this time,
that appropriate measures will be taken in the near future. Addi-
tionally, support exists in the Parliament for measures of this nature
as well.
In December of 1990,the Committee on Legal Affairs and Citizens'
Rights issued an opinion for the Committee on the Environment,
Public Health and Consumer Protection regarding "financial incen-
tives for measures for environmental protection and on a new Com-
munity approach to reconciling economic and ecological considerations
in a market economy."'' ° The opinion called on the Committee on
the Environment, Public Health and Consumer Protection to ask the
Commission to submit to Parliament a strategy for applying financial
initiatives in the area of environmental policy in accordance with
articles 100a and 130r of the Treaty. Given the across the board
recognition that these instruments are necessary components of the
Community's environmental policies, it appears that their introduction
is inevitable.
Evidence of the implementation of this approach is already present.
The area which will most likely be initially addressed is that of carbon
dioxide emissions (C02). Mr. Ripa di Meana, the EC Environment
Commissioner, released a confidential proposal to the Commission
to impose a substantial excise tax on gasoline in order to address
global warming and combat excessive energy consumption.102 The
document foresees a five year introductory period culminating with
a tax of $10 per barrel of oil; additionally, the paper suggests that
the fall of prices after the Gulf War may present a "unique window
of opportunity." 03
Shortly after release of the Commissioner's paper, the Commission
proposed a "green tax" on carbon dioxide emissions, focusing pri-
marily on automobiles and power plants.'(" The plan advocates a
graduated tax based on the level of C02 emission. An explanatory
paper has been sent to the Council of twelve environment ministers;
if they react favorably the Commission can be expected to furnish
implementing directives within the coming months.10
10 1990-1991, PARL. EUR. Doc. (Dec. 5, 1990).
102 Pienaar, EC Carbon Tax Proposed, The Independent, Dec. 20, 1990, at 1.
103 Id.
'% Johnson, "Green" Tax on Coal Could Cut Harmful Gas, Says EC, The Daily
Telegraph, Jan. 12, 1991, at 9.
105 Id.
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One sign of the Commission's intent to harmonize environmentally
directed fiscal initiatives is its recent rejection of a German proposal
to provide tax benefits for cleaner burning diesel automobiles. Bonn
planned to grant tax breaks of $358 on new diesels that complied
with emission criteria which were stricter than the recently imposed
Community standard. The Commission held that while the plan was
not a state subsidy, it nonetheless was a trade distortion favoring
cars meeting the non-EC standard. 1°6 The Commission has taken a
strong stance in enforcing its position that no Member State fiscal
instrument may exist which attempts to regulate an area previously
harmonized by the Community. This is a clear indication that the
Commission intends to take the reigns of the region's environmental
policy and that its actions will preempt any existing contradictory
Member State legislation.
From these developments it appears that the Commission is ini-
tiating a move toward the centralized control of environmental policy
through the use of economic and fiscal instruments as envisioned in
the Experts' Report. The Report placed its greatest emphasis on the
problem of global warming, and therefore the Commission has un-
dertaken to address that issue first. While such a step is only one
aspect of the plan of action called for by the Report, its importance
must not be minimized. The successful implementation of a carbon
tax on a Community-wide basis will create the framework for a
comprehensive system of economic and fiscal instruments within EC
environmental policy.
Given that there is no painless or perfect solution to the environ-
mental problems facing the Community, the use of economic and
fiscal instruments is a positive step toward achieving a sustainable
balance between economic growth and environmental protection.
IV. CONCLUSION
Clearly there will be economic costs to a comprehensive program
of economic and fiscal instruments as proposed by the Experts'
Report; however, a much greater cost would result if the Community
did not take steps to rectify the ineffective environmental controls
presently in place. Additionally, any short term damage to Community
undertakings can be mitigated through the use of Commission sub-
sidies.
,01 German Diesel Tax Break Illegal, EC Rules, Reuters, Jan. 16, 1991, at Financial
Report.
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The more important aspect of this policy is that it is an effective
means to address environmental degradation within the Community
through dynamic mechanisms which reduce injury in a way that no
static control can. Through such a program, the undertakings of the
Community are encouraged to develop clean technology that will
grant them a clear competitive advantage in the international market
in years to come. The control of these financial initiatives must come
under the authority of the Commission in order to achieve harmo-
nization required of the Internal Market.
The Community has initiated a new era of environmental policy
that should provide a successful model for the coexistence of economic
growth and environmental protection.
John B. Nicholson
